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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1  Background of the study 
Pre–1994 South Africa was characterised by apartheid, that is, structured and legitimate 
discrimination practices based on race. As a result of international pressure and internal resisting 
forces, the year 1994 marked the end of that regime, after which a new history of South Africa had 
started. Post-1994 saw the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) with a range of rights 
– civil and political rights (CPRs) as well as socio-economic rights (SERs). The end of apartheid was 
also marked by South Africa signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)1 
and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).2 The latter is the 
primary treaty at the United Nations (UN) level on economic, social and cultural rights.3   
 Considering the South African Constitution’s far reaching commitment to economic, social 
and cultural rights, it was hoped that signature of the ICESCR would, without any substantial delay, 
be followed by ratification. In 1995, Professor Sandra Liebenberg wrote that ‘following the signature 
of the Covenant (the ICESCR), the Department of Foreign Affairs has indicated that ratification on 
behalf of South Africa can be expected in the near future.4  
 However, until now, the ICESCR has not yet been ratified. In terms of its human rights 
commitment, South Africa has ratified five of the six major treaties protecting human rights’5 
namely, the ICCPR, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                           
1
  The ICCPR was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 23 March 1976.  South Africa signed the ICCPR on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 10 October 1998. 
2
  The ICESCR was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 3 January 1976.  South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994 but has not yet ratified it.  
3
  See chapter 2 of this dissertation for further discussion on the ICESCR. 
4
  S Liebenberg ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights and its implications for South 
Africa’ (1995) 11(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 371. 
5
  L Mashava ‘Time to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2000) 2(3) ESR 
Review 18.  
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Discrimination (CERD)6, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW)7, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT)8 and the Convention on Rights of the Child (CRC).9 The ICESCR is 
therefore the outstanding major human rights treaty which South Africa has not ratified to date. It is 
to be noted that the ICESCR is considered as part of the International Bill of Rights along with the 
ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).10 Moreover, as will be 
seen subsequently, South Africa’s Constitution is modelled on the ICESCR.11 Hence, one may 
question why the ICESCR, as one of the major international human rights instrument, was singled 
out from the ratification process, especially considering the extensive SERs guarantees in its 
Constitution. 
 SERs12 are included in the South African Constitution (the Constitution) as justiciable rights. 
This inclusion was preceded by objections relating to separation of powers and institutional 
competence concerns, which the Constitutional Court did not find to be valid.13 The inclusion of SERs 
in the Constitution as justiciable rights is indicative of the commitment of the new constitutional 
order to redress the situations of the poor and the historically disadvantaged groups.14  Accordingly, 
the Constitution is viewed by many as a transformative document. As Justice Chaskalson succinctly 
puts it in Soobramaney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (Soobramaney): 15 
                                                           
6
  The CERD was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and entered into 
force on 4 January 1969. South Africa signed the CERD on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 10 October 1998. 
7
  The CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1981. South Africa signed the CEDAW on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 15 December 1995. 
8
  The CAT was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 and entered into force on 
26 June 1987. South Africa signed the CAT on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 10 December 1998. 
9
  The CRC was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 
2 September 1990. South Africa signed the CRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995. 
10
  The Universal Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. 
11
   See chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
12
  The use of the terminology SERs does not exclude cultural rights, when discussing these rights in the 
international or general context. 
13
  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC). (First Certification judgment) The justiciability debate is discussed further in chapter 3 of 
this dissertation.  
14
  S Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights’ in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1998) 41-1. 
15
  1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 8. 
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We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These 
conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them 
and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies 
at the heart of our new constitutional order. 
However, over a decade since the Constitution was adopted and the subsequent interpretation of 
SERs by the courts16, access to health care, housing, education and social security for the poor 
remain matters of deep concern. Though the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence has been 
progressive, there is need for improvement, especially for poor people who are not able to get 
redress. 
 Therefore, the ratification of the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol (OP–ICESCR)17 may 
complement the role of the Constitutional Court and promote the SERs of the poor more efficiently 
and adequately. The adoption of the OP–ICESCR is further recognised at the international level and 
confirms the justiciability of SERs and the relevance of the ICESCR in fighting poverty. As a result, 
there may be a case to discuss the likely added benefits of ratification of the ICESCR and OP-ICESCR.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Poverty is still a challenge in South Africa and the poor still do not have adequate access to clean 
water, health services or housing. South Africa has 10.7%18 of a population of 49.32 million19 living 
below the poverty line, that is, below $1 a day. In addition, the country has an unemployment rate 
                                                           
16
  See chapter 3 section 3.4 of this dissertation. 
17
  The OP-ICESCR was unanimously adopted on 10 December 2008 and has been opened for signature last 
September this year. For further reading, see L Chenwi ‘Correcting the historical  asymmetry between rights: The Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 
23. 
18
  The Ibrahim Index of African Governance ‘Poverty rate at $1 per person per day National poverty rate Income 
inequality (gini index)’ (2008)  2  <http://site.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-
2008/pdf/final%20papers/Final%20SSC%20Files%20pdf/V%20Final%20Human%20Development%20pdf/Poverty/Poverty%
20$1%20per%20day.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
19
  Statistics South Africa ‘Mid-year population estimates, 2009’ (2009) 7 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/PublicationsHTML/P03022009/html/P03022009.html> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
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of 23.6%.20 Hence, these statistics show inadequate enforcement of SERs in the country, which 
establishes the need to consider the ICESCR in completing domestic efforts. 
 The Constitutional Court, in interpreting and enforcing the SERs in the Constitution, has 
referred to the interpretation of these rights in the ICESCR by the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Committee on ESCR). However, the Constitutional Court has not accepted the 
minimum core approach which caters more adequately for the needs of the poor in providing more 
specific and effective remedies.21 Hence, it is important to consider the ratification of the ICESCR as 
this could compel the Constitutional Court to consider this approach in addition to the 
reasonableness standard of reviewing SERs.22 
 Furthermore, the ultimate court at the national (South African) level where victims  of SERs 
violations can appeal is the Constitutional Court and if no adequate remedy is granted, they can only 
have recourse to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission)  as 
South Africa has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).23 
However, the OP-ICESCR, if signed and ratified by South Africa, would provide claimants with a 
choice between the regional system and the UN system.24  
1.3 Research questions 
The research questions which flow from the background and the problem statement are two–fold: 
1. Is the domestic protection and enforcement of SERs sufficient per se without the ratification 
of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR; and 
                                                           
20
  Statistics South Africa ‘Quarterly labour force survey, Quarter 2, 2009’ (2009) 5 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/PublicationsHTML/P02112ndQuarter2009/html/P02112ndQuarter2009.html (accessed 21 
October 2009). 
21
  See Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) 
(Grootboom); Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) (TAC); and the most recent 
case of Lindiwe Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28 (Mazibuko). 
22
  See chapter 3 section 3.4 of this dissertation.  
23
  The African Charter was adopted on 27 June 1981 by the OAU and entered into force on 21 October 1986.   South 
Africa ratified the African Charter on 9 July 1996.     
24
   See chapter 2 section 2.5 of this dissertation where the OP-ICESCR is discussed in more detail and see chapter 4 
section 4.3 of this dissertation in view of the latter’s benefits for South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
2. Would the ratification of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR enhance the domestic protection 
and enforcement of SERs in South Africa?  
1.4 Significance of the study 
The value that this study will bring will be two-fold. Firstly, it would contribute to the literature on 
SERs in South Africa through the assessment of not only the added benefits the ratification of the 
ICESCR will bring but also the advantages of ratifying the OP-ICESCR. At present, academics have 
mostly focused on the need of ratifying the ICESCR but not really assessing it in depth. Moreover, as 
to date no study has been done on the likely benefits of South Africa becoming a party to the OP-
ICESCR. Secondly, on the practical side, the study would also provide general recommendations as to 
how the various actors, be it state or non state actors, can contribute in enhancing the protection of 
SERs through the use of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR. The  importance of this study is its 
illustration of how the provisions of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR, upon ratification, can be of help 
in alleviating poverty and providing better SERs provisions to South Africans. 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
This study aims to: 
• Argue the added benefits for South Africa to ratify the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR as well as 
their implications. 
• Explore some key laws, policies and case law which would give a clear picture as to where 
South Africa stands in its delivery of SERs. 
• Expose some of the key areas of difficulties in the implementation and enforcement of SERs 
in South Africa. 
1.6 Literature review 
 There is limited literature on the implications of South Africa ratifying the ICESCR. Liebenberg,25 for 
instance, analysed the implications of the ratification of the ICESCR at the time the interim 
                                                           
25
    Liebenberg (n 4 above) 359 – 378. 
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Constitution of South Africa was in place. However, the interim Constitution, unlike the 1996 
Constitution, did not include the right to adequate housing, social security and to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. This study differs substantially from Liebenberg’s 
as the evaluation is undertaken at a time when the Constitution incorporates justiciable SERs, which 
have been implemented and enforced for more than a decade now.  
 In addition, a relevant work to this study is that of De Vos 26 who scrutinizes the justiciability 
of SERs under the 1996 Constitution and explains how in practice it might be properly applied. The 
work of Eide et al.27 is also relevant to this study with regard to the discussion on the ICESCR.  
 Also, recent studies which deal with the ratification of the OP-ICESCR have not focussed on 
South Africa, for instance the study of the process and consequences of ratifying the OP-ICESCR by 
Norway is used in this study.28 This study would add to the existing literature as it discusses the 
ratification by South Africa of the recently adopted OP-ICESCR, its likely implications and the added 
benefits it would bring in furthering the protection of SERs in the country. 
1.7 Methodology 
The methodology employed was mainly Desktop research, relying on books, journals, reports and 
statistics as well as case law and legislation on SERs in South Africa. In addition, documents such as 
the ICESCR, OP-ICESCR and the general comments of the UN Committee on ESCR were used.  
1.8 Summary of chapters 
Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 focuses on the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR, explaining its 
present status with regard to South Africa and if ratified, its legal status and mechanisms for its 
enforcement at the national level. Chapter 3 introduces the substantive content of the domestic 
                                                           
26
  P de Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution’ (1997) 13(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 67 – 101. 
27
  A Eide et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2001). 
28
  See BA Simmons ‘Should states ratify? - Process and consequences of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’ (2009) 
27 Nordisk Tidsskrift Menneskerettigheter 64; and IL Backer ‘Ideals and implementation – Ratifying another complaints 
procedure?’ (2009) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift Menneskerettigheter 91. 
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protection of SERs in comparison with the ICESCR. An overview of key domestic case law on SERs is 
also provided. This is followed by an assessment of the contribution or use of the ICESCR in domestic 
jurisprudence. Chapter 4 focuses on the likely added benefits of ratification of the ICESCR and the 
OP-ICESCR, that is, the impact on the domestic legal order. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides a conclusion to 
the study, including the role of the various players in the promotion of SERs in South Africa through 
the ICESCR. 
1.9 Limitations of the study 
This study, due to the limited length, only gives a ‘snapshot,’ that is, just an overview of the likely 
added benefits of ratifying the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR without really going into details on the 
specific rights and provisions. In addition, being an overview, the dissertation only makes reference 
to key South African case law on the matter, engaging in an in depth study of all the SERs 
jurisprudence. The focus on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court might also be seen as a 
limitation, but the reason behind same is based on the fact that it is the highest jurisdiction in 
constitutional matters.  
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Chapter 2 
An overview of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and its Optional Protocol 
2.1  Introduction 
The foundation of international human rights law has been laid by the Universal Declaration. 
Following the adoption of the Universal Declaration, the process of translating the rights recognised 
in it into binding international conventions gave birth to the ICCPR29 and the ICESCR.30 The three of 
them taken together are known as the International Bill of Rights. It is to be borne in mind that the 
Universal Declaration contains both sets of rights; that is, CPRs and SERs.31 Hence, the question 
arises as to why two separate international treaties were adopted for each set of rights. Does it 
mean that SERs are different from CPRs? This raises the need to briefly explore the rationale for such 
a distinction. 
2.1.1  The rationale for the distinction between civil and political rights and socio-
 economic rights 
There were political reasons which led to the distinction between these two sets of rights. During 
the Cold War, the states from the East, that is socialist countries, recognised SERs whereas states 
from the West, which were capitalist countries emphasised CPRs. This division in political ideologies 
gave rise to academic and legal foundations justifying the separation of these two sets of rights.  
Those advocating for two separate covenants were of the opinion that, on the one hand, CPRs were 
                                                           
29
 165 countries are party to the ICCPR. All African countries are party to the ICCPR except Comoros, Guinea Bissau and Sao 
Tome and Principe. See <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en> (accessed 5 October 2009). 
30
 As at 30 October 2009, it had 160 member states. 5 African countries have not ratified the ICESCR including South Africa, 
namely, Botswana, Comoros, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe.  
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en> (accessed 5 October 
2009). 
31
  Arts 3 to 21 provide for CPRs to which everyone is entitled. These CPRs are: the right to life, liberty and personal 
security, including freedom from slavery, torture and arbitrary arrest, as well as the rights to a fair trial, free speech and 
free movement and privacy. Whereas arts 22 to 27 provide for the economic, social and cultural rights that is, the right to 
social security, right to work, fair remuneration and leisure, right to an adequate standard of living for health, well-being 
and education, and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community. 
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‘enforceable, or justiciable, or of an “absolute” character’ while on the other hand, SERs could not be 
immediately enforced as they were to be implemented progressively, hence were seen as 
programmatic rights.32 Nevertheless, those in favour of one document containing both sets of rights 
argued that human rights could not unequivocally be distinguished in different categories nor ‘could 
they be so classified as to represent a hierarchy of values.’33 International support weighed more in 
favour of capitalist countries and two separate instruments were drawn. However, those political 
standpoints did not truly portray that the war between political ideologies in fact involved two sets 
of rights which are ‘universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.’34 
2.2  The interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights  
The Vienna Declaration was the international instrument that explicitly declared that all human 
rights must be treated ‘in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis.’35 This interdependency is also reflected in the preambles of both the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, which provide that the ultimate freedom of human beings can be achieved only when every 
human being enjoys CPRs as well as SERs.36 In addition, since the Universal Declaration contains both 
sets of rights, it can be concluded that it was drafted in the letter and spirit of indivisibility and 
interdependency between CPRs and SERs.  
 At the African regional level, the African Charter explicitly recognises this interdependency 
by stating that CPRs and SERs cannot be dissociated both in their conception and universality and 
further stipulates that the enjoyment of SERs is essential for the full realisation of CPRs.37 Hence, the 
distinction between the two seems to be one motivated by mainly political ideologies as mentioned 
                                                           
32
  H Steiner & P Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2000) 245. 
33
   Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 245. 
34
  The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna Declaration), adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, para 5 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/vienna.htm> (accessed 17 August 
2009). 
35
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 245. 
36
  Para 3 of the Preambles to the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
37
  Preamble 6 to the African Charter. It is to be noted that all African states have ratified the African Charter with 
the exception of Morocco.  
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above. To further show that these rights cannot be practically alienated, two examples are cited by 
Steiner and Alston:38 
(1) The right to form trade unions is contained in the ICESCR, while the right to freedom of 
association is recognized in the ICCPR. 
… 
(3) While the right to education and parental liberty to choose a child’s school is dealt with in the 
ICESCR,[
39
] the liberty of parents to choose their child’s religious and moral education is 
recognised in the ICCPR[
40
]. 
Thus, because all human beings are ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’,41 the optimal human 
rights protection will only be achieved if states recognise that both sets of rights are ‘two sides of the 
same coin’ and start treating them with the same prominence. In line with the above, the 
international community is increasingly moving towards a universal acceptance of the indivisibility 
and interdependency of human rights. Despite their undisputed link, there are however normative 
differences between the ICCPR and the ICESCR which need to be highlighted. 
2.2.1  The normative differences between the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
The first difference lies in the way article 2(1) of both covenants have been framed whereby that of 
the ICCPR provides for a state party to ‘undertake to respect and to ensure to all individuals … the 
rights recognized’ in the ICCPR, whereas the ICESCR provides for a state party to ‘take steps … to the 
maximum of its available resources … [towards] achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights …’ This clearly shows that the obligation on the state party under the ICCPR is different from 
that under the ICESCR. The ICESCR aims at progressive realisation of SERs whereas CPRs are to be 
immediately enforced. However, the ICESCR not only perceives full realization of SERs in a 
progressive manner while giving recognition to the limited resources available to a state party, but 
‘it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect.’42 
                                                           
38
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 247. 
39
  Art 13 of the ICESCR. 
40
  Art 18 of the ICCPR. 
41
  Art 1 of the Universal Declaration. 
42
  UN Committee on ESCR General Comment No 3, The nature of states parties obligation, UN Doc E/1991/23 
(1990), para 1. An example would be the exercise of the rights without discrimination as set forth by article 2(2) of the 
ICESCR.  
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 Another difference lies in the phraseology of the different rights set forth in the two 
covenants. The ICCPR, in defining its rights, uses terms such as ‘[e]veryone has’ or ‘[n]o one shall’ 
whereas the ICESCR uses the terminology ‘[s]tates parties … recognize’43 The difference in 
terminology can be explained by the fact that SERs are seen as positive rights which involve positive 
duties on the state whereas CPRs are seen as negative rights suggesting that states should refrain 
from intervening in peoples’ private lives and in the exercise of their freedoms. Nonetheless, despite 
these differences, there exist substantive indivisibility, interdependency and interrelatedness 
between those two sets of rights. For instance, the right to vote which is known to be a CPR also 
contains positive duties which require resource allocations on behalf of the state. In other words, 
the state needs to provide huge financial resources for elections to be held and allow citizens to cast 
their votes. Hence, the argument that CPRs are seen as having only negative duties and not positive 
ones does not seem to apply. 
2.2.2  Towards a universal interdependency of civil, political and socio-economic rights 
The indivisibility and interdependency of CPRs and SERs were seen through the drafting of 
subsequent international human rights treaties. Three treaties at the UN level would be used briefly 
as examples here, namely the CRC44, CERD45 and CEDAW.46 The three aforesaid treaties all 
respectively contain both sets of rights, that is, CPRs and SERs. For instance, article 2(2) of the CERD 
and article 3 of the CEDAW set forth explicitly the equal exercise and enjoyment of SERs and CPRs. 
Concerning the CRC, it provides for freedom of expression,47 freedom of association48 along with 
other CPRs together with the right to education49 and the right to health,50 among other SERs. With 
the ratification of the CRC by 193 states51, it can be said that there is a universal recognition of the 
indivisibility and interdependency of CPRs and SERs. Despite the interrelatedness that exists 
                                                           
43
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 246. 
44
  See chapter 1 section 1.1 of this dissertation. 
45
  See chapter 1 section 1.1 of this dissertation. 
46
  See chapter 1 section 1.1 of this dissertation. 
47
  Art 13 of the CRC. 
48
  Art 15 of the CRC. 
49
  Art 28 of the CRC 
50
  Art 24 of the CRC. 
51
  As of 21 October 2009. See <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en > (accessed 21 October 2009) 
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between these two sets of rights, the effect and nature of obligations under the ICESCR are distinct 
and unique. For that reason, the obligations which arise under the latter have to be dealt with.  
 2.3 The obligations of states parties under the ICESCR 
The obligations of states parties under the ICESCR include both obligations of conduct and result.52 
The ICESCR provides that the full realisation of SERs cannot be achieved immediately; therefore the 
state party should take steps to progressively achieve these rights within its available resources.53 
There may be an impression that the rights under the ICESCR only seem to be of progressive 
realisation. However, the ICESCR also provides for rights of immediate implementation.54 In addition, 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht 
Guidelines)55 states that the ICESCR imposes three types of obligations namely, the obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil56 and that each of these obligations contains both obligations of conduct 
and result.57 In fact, the Committee on ESCR has applied this ‘tripartite typology’58 and this has been 
                                                           
52
  General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) para 1. The obligation of conduct refers to the actions by the state party 
aimed at meeting the realisation of SERs whereas the obligation of result refers to the requirement of a state party to 
achieve a particular specific target. 
53
  General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) para 1 & 2 and art 2(1) of the ICESCR. In addition, the steps to be taken 
should be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted … towards meeting the obligations …’ 
54
   General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) para 1 & 5. The rights of immediate implementation are equal rights of men 
and women (article 3), equal pay for equal work (article 7(a)(i)), the right to form trade unions and the right to strike 
(article 8), the right of children to special protection (article 10(3)), the right to free primary education (article 13(2)(a)), the 
freedom of choice of school (article13(3)), the freedom to establish schools (article 13(4)), and the freedom for scientific 
research (article 15(3)). 
55
  ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 691 - 705.  
56
  Maastricht Guidelines (n 55 above) 693. 
57
  Maastricht Guidelines (n 55 above) 694. 
58
  M Sepulveda The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2003) 15. 
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expressly done with regard to the rights to adequate food59, education60 and health.61 According to 
the Maastricht Guidelines:62 
The obligation to respect requires the state to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of [SERs] ... 
The obligation to protect requires states to prevent violations of such rights by third parties [and] ... 
[t]he obligation to fulfil requires the state to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, 
judicial and other measures towards the full realisation of those rights. 
In addition, the South African Bill of Rights recognises not only the three aforesaid levels of 
obligations, but also explicitly recognises the obligation to promote human rights.63 Further, the 
Maastricht Guidelines consider that the ‘failure to perform any of these three obligations constitute 
a violation of these rights.’64  
 The effect of ratification of the ICESCR would also include its status in the domestic 
jurisdiction of the state party and the approach to be adopted to implement its obligations.  
2.4 The application of the ICESCR at the domestic level  
The domestic application of the ICESCR follows the general principles of public international law, 
that is, ‘a party cannot invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty’65 and ‘[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating ...[his] fundamental rights.’66 Flowing from these two principles, 
international law requires a state, upon ratification of a treaty, to set up national remedies in case of 
breach of rights set forth in the treaty.  There is clearly a ‘primacy of national remedies’67 as even 
                                                           
59
  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 12, Right to adequate food, UN 
Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999)  para 15.  
60
  UN Committee on ESCR General Comment No 13, The right to education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) para 46.  
61
  UN Committee on ESCR General Comment No 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health, UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) para 34 – 37.  
62
  Maastricht Guidelines (n 55 above) 694. 
63
  Article 7(2) of the Constitution; further discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
64
  Maastricht Guidelines (n 55 above) 694. 
65
  UN Committee on ESCR General Comment No 9, The domestic application of the Covenant, UN Doc 
E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) para 3, citing article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.  
66
  General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) para 3, citing article 8 of the Universal Declaration.  
67
   General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) para 4. 
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before having recourse to international complaints mechanisms, domestic remedies have to be 
exhausted. In the event that violations of treaty obligations take place, international avenues are 
‘only supplementary to effective national remedies.’68 In view of the importance of national 
remedies and the fact that the ICESCR does not precisely set forth what measures are to be adopted 
by states parties in order to give effect to its provisions, the Committee on ESCR has designed 
principles to be followed in that line of action.69 In addition, the remedies need not necessarily be 
judicial remedies, but need to be ‘accessible, affordable, timely and effective.’70 It is worth noting at 
this point that, though South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, it has constitutionally entrenched 
SERs which are justiciable.71 However, for international norms of SERs to be recognised in domestic 
jurisdictions, states should at least express their consent in ratifying the ICESCR. Upon ratification, 
states would have to implement the ICESCR and ensure, as directed by the Committee on ESCR, that 
they adopt judicial or other effective remedies for the implementation of SERs.72  
 The adoption of appropriate means to give effect to the provisions of the ICESCR73 is 
incomplete without an assessment of the monitoring system which ensures compliance with the 
ICESCR provisions at the international level.  
2.5 Monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR  
The Committee on ESCR74 is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR.75 It 
consists of 18 independent experts. States parties to the ICESCR are under a legal obligation to 
                                                           
68
   General Comment No 9 (n 65 above). 
69
  General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) paras 7& 8 provide for the following principles: First, the means of 
implementation chosen must be adequate to ensure fulfilment of the obligations... [and] justiciability; second, account 
should be taken of the means which have proved to be most effective in the country concerned; third, while the Covenant 
does not formally oblige states to incorporate its provisions in domestic law, such an approach is desirable.  
70
  General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) para 9. 
71
  See chapter 3 for further discussion of the South African context. 
72
  General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) para 4. 
73
  General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) para 1. 
74
  According to Part IV of the ICESCR, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is supposed to be the body 
responsible for ensuring compliance at international level. However, the Committee on ESCR was established under 
ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985 to carry out the monitoring functions assigned to the ECOSOC in Part IV of the 
ICESCR. 
75
  ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 (n 74 above).  
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submit an initial report within two years of ratifying the ICESCR and thereafter periodic reports76 
every 5 years.77 The Committee on ESCR also provides its interpretation of the provisions of the 
ICESCR in the form of general comments.78 The only monitoring system which existed to ensure 
effective implementation of the ICESCR was the submission of periodic reports to the Committee on 
ESCR  which would in turn prepare concluding observations expressing, amongst others, the areas of 
concern and make recommendations to the state party. Such a monitoring system may be effective 
if widely published, thereby, allowing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society to 
exert pressure on the government to implement the proposed recommendations. However, in no 
way does this provide an effective and timely remedy to individual or group complainants living in 
jurisdictions where SERs are not justiciable. Hence, the need arises for recognising the international 
justiciability of SERs.  
 With regard to individual or group complaints, on 10 December 2008 as noted earlier, the 
UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the OP-ICESCR,79 which empowers the Committee on 
ESCR to receive and consider communications. The latter is not yet in force, but opened for signature 
on 24 September 2009 and has been signed by 30 countries as at 22 October 2009.80 It will come 
into force after 10 ratifications.81 Under the OP-ICESCR, communications can be submitted either by 
individuals (including groups of individuals)82 or by states parties83 to the Committee on ESCR. 
Submissions should be made within the time limit of one year after exhaustion of domestic remedies 
                                                           
76
  The reports must follow specific guidelines known as Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents developed by the 
Committee on ESCR and these reports are to be submitted by states parties under arts 16 & 17 of the ICESCR which were 
adopted by the Committee at its 49
th
 meeting (forty-first session) on 18 November 2008, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2. 
77
  ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 (n 74 above). 
78
  General Comment No 1, Reporting by state parties, UN Doc E/1989/22 (1989), para 1 where it was stated as 
follows: ‘At its second session, in 1988, the Committee decided (E/1988/14, para 366 and 367), pursuant to an invitation 
addressed to it by the Economic and Social Council (resolution 1987/5) and endorsed by the General Assembly (resolution 
42/102), to begin, as from its third session, the preparation of general comments based on the various articles and 
provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with a view to assisting the States parties 
in fulfilling their reporting.’  
79
   UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/117. 
80
  The following countries have signed the OP-ICESCR: Argentina,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Belgium, Chile, Congo,   
Ecuador,  El Salvador,  Finland,  Gabon,  Ghana, Guatemala,  Guinea-Bissau,  Italy,   Luxembourg,  Madagascar,  Mali,  
Montenegro,  Netherlands, Portugal,   Senegal,  Slovakia, Slovenia,  Solomon Islands,  Spain,  Timor-
Leste, Togo, Ukraine, Uruguay. See <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> (accessed 22 October 2009). 
81
   Art 18 of the OP-ICESCR.  See also Chenwi (n 17 above) 28 - 29. 
82
  Art 1 of the OP-ICESCR. 
83
  Art 10 of the OP-ICESCR. However, a communication can only be submitted by a state party if the latter has 
recognised the competence of the Committee in this regard. 
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and the communications should not be exclusively based on media reports for them to be 
admissible.84  
 The contribution of the OP-ICESCR to the protection of SERs can be seen through the powers  
granted to the Committee on ESCR, in addition to receiving complaints,  to adopt interim measures 
‘to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims,’85 the power to conduct inquiries into grave and 
systematic violations, along with the follow-up procedures.86 The OP–ICESCR, as a result of its 
operation within the international sphere, which forces states parties to act through the concept of 
‘mobilisation of shame’ (discussed subsequently) has the potential to improve the delivery of SERs 
even in states which have justiciable SERs like South Africa. Also, the South African Constitutional 
Court has adopted the reasonableness approach while rejecting the minimum core approach.87 
However, should the ICESCR be ratified along with the OP–ICESCR, the Court would, arguably, have 
to rethink its position on the minimum core approach since the ICESCR will become binding.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The ICESCR, along with the ICCPR as well as the Universal Declaration, represent the concretisation 
of values and ideals of human rights into obligations on states parties. Due to historical political 
reasons, distinctions were made between CPRs and SERs. However, with the principles of 
interdependence of these two sets of rights being reiterated by the Vienna Declaration, this 
distinction seems to weaken. Furthermore, the breakthrough of the OP-ICESCR shows that there is 
an increasing international recognition of the justiciability of SERs. However, the international 
obligations of respecting, protecting and fulfilling SERs can only be achieved if countries ratify both 
the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol. In essence, the realisation of SERs requires action to translate 
the commitments in legislation and normative instruments into reality. Consequently, the question 
arises as to whether South Africa needs to ratify the ICESCR knowing that it has justiciable SERs. 
Nevertheless, prior to embarking on the benefits of South Africa in ratifying these treaties, a study of 
the extent to which the rights have been enforced in South Africa is necessary. 
                                                           
84
  These are only the essential criteria for admissibility; art 3 of the OP-ICESCR provides for others such as it should 
not be anonymous and it should be compatible with the ICESCR, amongst others.  
85
  Art 5 of the OP-ICESCR. 
86
  Art 9 of the OP–ICESCR. 
87
  See chapter 3 section 3.4 of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Enforcement of socio- economic rights in the South African context 
3.1 Introduction 
The inclusion of SERs in the South African Constitution was not an easy task. Arguments as to 
whether SERs are justiciable were not only the subject matter of international discussions88, but 
similar arguments also repeated themselves in South Africa.89 Despite having dealt with the 
objections of justiciability of SERs at the international level in the previous chapter, it further 
remains important to highlight the arguments in the South African context, mainly because these 
arguments are ongoing through scholarly critics and judgments of the Constitutional Court. The two 
main arguments were that firstly, SERs were not universally accepted rights and secondly, should the 
courts adjudicate on such rights, it would breach the sacrosanct principle of separation of powers. 
Hence, this chapter briefly revisits this debate in the domestic context and in order to show how 
those arguments have been counteracted.  
 During the past 15 years of its constitutional democracy, the South African Constitutional 
Court90 has delivered some key judgments on SERs which shall be critically analysed, especially with 
regard to their interpretation and application. In analysing the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court, reference will also be made to instances where the latter has explicitly used the provisions of 
the ICESCR and general comments of the Committee on ESCR as interpretative guides. This is 
followed by a pragmatic examination of the remedies granted by the Constitutional Court along with 
other remedies which may be available in such matters. 
 It should be noted that the judiciary is not the only organ constitutionally mandated to 
watch over the effective realisation of SERs. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), 
as per section 184(3) of the Constitution, is mandated on a yearly basis to collect information on 
                                                           
88
  See chapter 2 section 2.1.1 of this dissertation. 
89
  M Pieterse ‘Possibilities and pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of social rights: Contemplating the South 
African experience’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 885. 
90
  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the focus of the dissertation is on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court, as it is the highest court in constitutional matters.  
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measures that have been taken by the organs of the state for realising SERs. However, the role of 
the SAHRC is not analysed as the focus is on the judiciary. 
3.2 The South African approach to the enforceability of SERs 
The 1996 South African Constitution, also known as the final Constitution had to be approved by the 
Constitutional Court and it was in the First Certification judgment91 that the inclusion of SERs in the 
Constitution was approved. The objections raised to their inclusion related more specifically to the 
issue of legitimacy and competency of the courts and, to that effect, the Constitutional Court 
observed: 92 
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in Courts making orders which have 
direct implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a court enforces civil and political 
rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it makes will often 
have such implications ... In our view, it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within 
a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon this court so different from that ordinarily conferred upon 
them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the separation of powers ... The fact that socio-
economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to [budgetary] implications does not seem to us to be 
a bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected 
from improper invasion. 
 
Thus, though South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, it has nevertheless gone a step ahead by 
incorporating explicit SERs in its Constitution. Hence, in the South African context, the issue is no 
longer about whether SERs are justiciable, but now relates to how to ‘enforce them in a given 
case.’93  Before considering how these rights have been enforced, a comparison of the SERs 
provisions in the ICESR and the Constitution is undertaken. 
                                                           
91
  First Certification Judgment (n 13 above). 
92
   First Certification Judgment (n 13 above) para 77-78. 
93
   Grootboom (n 21 above) para 20.  
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3.3 Socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution and the ICESCR 
 distinguished 
As pointed out earlier, South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, but it has constitutionally guaranteed 
SERs, thereby warranting a comparison between the SERs provisions of the South African 
Constitution and those of the ICESCR.  The comparison of the ICESCR and the South African Bill of 
Rights will involve both similarities and differences in their wordings and the rights they provide for.  
 Firstly, the second subsections of articles 26 and 27 of the Bill of Rights are akin to article 
2(1) of the ICESCR except for its reference to ‘reasonable’ measures against the international 
standard of ‘appropriate’ measures. In addition, there is a slight difference in the way the resource 
constraint is phrased; whereby under article 2(1) of the ICESCR, states are obliged to the ‘maximum 
of available resources’, the Bill of Rights uses the term ‘within available resources.’ The ICESCR 
recognises, in its preamble94, human dignity as an underpinning principle and in the South African 
context, the Constitution explicitly mentions dignity as a value95 which needs to be used to interpret 
SERs. Further, the same has been reiterated in its jurisprudence, for instance, in the Grootboom 
case.96 With regard to the right to self determination,97 the ICESCR lays emphasis on the latter as a 
stepping stone to realising SERs. Another right which is both of interpretative value and guaranteed 
in the South African Constitution is the right to equality,98 which is also provided for in the ICESCR.99 
 Nevertheless, the Constitution is quite lacking when it comes to the provision of the right to 
work,100 when compared to the ICESCR. While the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the 
right to work,  the ICESCR provides not only for the right to seek employment freely, but also 
imposes a specific obligation on the state to work towards achieving that right, including having in 
place technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques. 
However, as a party to the African Charter and the CEDAW,101 such obligations are incumbent on 
                                                           
94
  Para 1 of the Preamble to the ICESCR. 
95
  Secs 7(2) & 10 of the Constitution. 
96
  Grootboom (n 21 above) 
97
  Art 1 of the ICESCR. 
98
   Secs 7(2) & 9 of the Constitution. 
99
  Art 2(2) of the ICESCR. 
100
  Sec 22 of the Constitution. 
101
  Art 15 of the African Charter; & art 11(1) of the CEDAW. 
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South Africa since it has ratified these instruments. Linked to the above, is the right to strike and to 
freely join trade unions, provided by both the ICESCR102 and the Constitution.103 
 Concerning the rights to food, housing and clothing, both the ICESCR104 and the 
Constitution105 provide for progressive realisation of these rights. However, while the ICESCR 
provides for these rights as part of the right to an adequate standard of living, the South African 
Constitution provides for the rights in separate sections. As regard the achievement of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, both the Constitution106 and the ICESR107 provide 
for the right to health. Lastly, concerning the right to education, the provision in the ICESCR108 is far 
more extensive than that in the Constitution.109   
 Though the rights might be present in the Constitution as well as the ICESCR, the 
interpretation of these rights by the Constitutional Court does not necessarily concur with those of 
the Committee on ESCR as will be seen in the section below. For instance, as will be seen below, the 
Constitutional Court has distinguished in Grootboom the right to adequate housing as provided for in 
article 11 of the ICESCR from that in section 26 of the Constitution. The Court observed that firstly, 
compared to the ICESCR which provides a right per se, the Constitution provides for the right to have 
‘access’ to adequate housing, and secondly that the ICESCR binds states to take ‘appropriate steps’ 
whereas the Constitution imposes the obligation to take ‘reasonable legislative and other 
measures.110 
                                                           
102
  Art 6 of the ICESCR. 
103
  Sec 23 of the Constitution. 
104
  Art 11 of the ICESCR. 
105
  Secs 26 & 27 of the Constitution. See also secs 28 and 35(2) (e) in relation to children and detainees, respectively. 
106
  Sec 27 of the Constitution. 
107
  Art 12 of the ICESCR. 
108
  Art 13(2) of the ICESCR. 
109
  Sec 29(1) of the Constitution. 
110
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 28. 
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3.4 Interpretation of socio-economic rights provisions by the 
 Constitutional Court 
Prior to embarking on the interpretation of the SERs provisions embedded in the Constitution, it 
would be important to generally explore the obligations which flow from the latter. First, the Bill of 
Rights is binding on the three arms of the government, that is, the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary.111 It applies not only vertically, between the state and the citizens, but also horizontally, in 
that it binds the natural and juristic persons.112  
 In its broad application, the South African Constitution imposes, on the states, certain 
obligations which are to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’113 the rights while upholding 
democratic values such as human dignity, equality and freedom.114 In the First Certification 
Judgment, it was clearly spelt out that at least the negative duties in relation to SERs should be 
protected from ‘invasion’ and are of immediate application.115 However, the positive duties are seen 
from sections 26(2)116 and 27(2) which impose on the state the obligation to ‘take reasonable 
measures within its available resources to achieve progressive realisation’ of the listed SERs. The 
terms ‘progressive realisation’ show that the full achievement of SERs is not immediate in nature. 
The Constitutional Court in Grootboom117 endorsed the meaning of progressive realisation in 
General Comment No 3118 and further stated that the latter ‘is in harmony with the context in which 
the phrase is used in our Constitution.’119 
                                                           
111
  Sec 8(1) of the Constitution. 
112
  Sec 8(2) of the Constitution. 
113
  Sec 7(1) of the Constitution. 
114
  Sec 7(2) of the Constitution. 
115
  First Certification Judgment (n 13 above) para 77-78. 
116
  It should be noted that even where a negative right such as the right not to be evicted without a court order 
provided for in sec 26(3), the Constitutional Court has read in positive obligations to this right. See Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) (Port Elizabeth).   
117
  Grootboom (n 21 above).  
118
  General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) para  9. 
119
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 45. 
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 Unlike these two sections, all other SERs120 provided for in the Bill of Rights have no express 
reference to the resource availability constraint as a limitation,121 thereby being of immediate 
application. However, it is important to note that some academics have argued that though 
children’s SERs do not per se contain any internal qualifications, they are not rights claimable upon 
demand as the SERs in section 28 of the Constitution are still subject to section 7 of the Constitution 
which provides for the obligation to fulfil, which would be interpreted as facilitating the realisation 
of the right, that is, subjecting it to progressive realisation.122 The key jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court analysed here mainly focus on the positive duties under sections 26 and 27. The 
negative duties which have been adjudicated upon were based on sections 26(3) and 27(3).  
 The first SERs case to be heard by the Constitutional Court was the case of Soobramaney,123 
where the Constitutional Court stated that there was no violation of the appellant’s right to 
emergency care as it was ‘an ongoing state of affairs which ... is incurable.’124 The Court considered 
whether his right to health under sections 27(1) and (2) had been breached. The eventual conclusion 
was that since the sections uses the terms ‘everyone’ and ‘within available resources’, there needs 
to be a prioritisation125 in providing for dialysis treatment in view of budgetary and resource 
constraints. Therefore, the standard of review in assessing the hospital policy in relation to qualifying 
patients for the dialysis program was as follows: ‘A Court will be slow to interfere with rational 
decisions taken in good faith by political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters.’126 Following the decision of Soobramaney, there was the landmark decision 
                                                           
120
  The SERs which fall in that category are the right not to be evicted prior to a court order under section 26(3), the 
right not to be refused emergency medical treatment under section 27(3), rights of children under section 28 and rights of 
detained persons under section 35 of the SA Constitution.  
121
  Liebenberg (n 14 above) 41-37. 
122
  See, for instance, DM Chirwa ‘Child Poverty and children’s rights of access to food and basic nutrition in South 
Africa’ (2009) Socio-Economic Rights Project Research Series 7 18. Section 28(1)(c) guarantees to children the rights to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and to social services. 
123
  In Soobramaney (n 15 above), the applicant was suffering from chronic renal failure along with a series of other 
diseases and was disqualified from a renal dialysis program as his health situation was irreversible, as a result of which he 
was not entitled to a kidney transplant. The renal dialysis program was his only chance to prolong his life. He challenged his 
disqualification to the dialysis program under the said hospital policy guidelines on the ground of section 27(3) of the SA 
Constitution, in that he could not be refused emergency medical treatment. 
124
  Soobramaney (n 15 above) para 21. 
125
  Soobramaney (n 15 above) para 19. 
126
  Soobramaney (n 15 above) para 29, showing the application of the ‘rationality’ and ‘good faith’ test. 
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of Grootboom,127 where the Court departed from the ‘rationality’ and ‘good faith’ tests  and adopted 
the ‘reasonableness’ standard of review. The Constitutional Court explains it as follows: 128 
A Court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The 
question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its 
obligations. 
In determining whether measures are reasonable, the Constitutional Court gave the following 
indicators: 
1. The measures must be coherent, balanced and flexible catering for short and long term 
needs.129 
2. Those who are in desperate need must be catered for.130 
3. The measures should be designed to accomplish their goals ‘expeditiously and effectively’.131  
4.  Appropriate financial and human resources must be made available for its enforcement.132 
The reasonableness test was again subsequently used in the TAC133 case, where a new component 
was introduced to the reasonableness test in that the measures should be transparent and widely 
known to the public.134   
                                                           
127
  In Grootboom (n 21 above), the respondents (390 adults and 510 children) were living in lamentable conditions: 
low income population, overcrowded shacks of which 95% had no electricity, water or sewage. Being on a low cost housing 
waiting list for years and facing indefinite intolerable conditions they moved to a private owned land which was earmarked 
for low cost housing. The owner brought court proceedings which led to eviction orders against them and their shacks 
were destroyed. Eventually, they took shelter in a sports field with temporary structures. The respondents appealed to the 
government to provide them with housing under section 26 of the Constitution while they wait for formal housing.  
128
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 41. 
129
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 41- 43. 
130
  Grootboom(n 21 above) para 43 and the Court even went further to say that in order to meet the test of 
reasonableness, it was not sufficient to show that the measures have the potential of realising statistical advance in the 
realisation of the right. 
131
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 46. 
132
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 39. 
133
  TAC (n 21 above). The facts were that the government restricted the distribution of nevirapine only to pilot sites 
relying on arguments such as efficacy, safety as well as lack of resources Therefore, the application sought to challenge the 
reasonableness of its restrictive distribution by the government. 
134
  TAC (n 21 above) para 123. 
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 The finding in Grootboom was that the government’s project was unreasonable as it failed in 
its obligation of providing adequate housing to those in desperate need.135 In coming to its decision, 
the Constitutional Court also referred to international law. In Grootboom, it was reiterated, based on 
section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution, that  relevant international law can be a tool of interpretation  
with varying degrees of weight.136 The relevant law referred to included General Comment No 3 of 
the Committee on ESCR which was used to interpret the meaning of progressive realisation and to 
decide on whether to adopt the minimum core approach as seen below. A distinction was made in 
Grootboom between the right to housing as provided by article 11 of the ICESCR and section 26 of 
the Constitution as noted above137 However, academics have argued that the distinction is 
‘superficial’ and not significant as it is difficult to conceive a situation where steps taken by the state 
could be ‘appropriate but not reasonable or vice versa.’138 The argument was raised in Grootboom as 
to whether section 26(1) provided an absolute obligation on the state to provide for the right to 
adequate housing to individuals on demand. The Court rejected the argument and held that it was 
not a self standing right to be enforced without consideration of the resource limitation under 
section 27(2).139  
 Similarly, in the case of Jaftha140, in deciding the meaning to be given to ‘adequate housing’, 
the Constitutional Court referred to article 11(1) of the ICESCR and General Comment No 14 before 
reaching its conclusion.  
 Also, in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 
(Joe Slovo case), the Court relied on General Comment No 7 of the Committee on ESCR. It observed 
that General Comment No 7 is in line with the law regulating evictions and should be followed in 
cases of relocations as a result of evictions.141 
                                                           
135
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 66. 
136
  Grootboom  (n 21 above) para 26. 
137
 Grootboom (n 21 above) para 28. 
138
  RE Kapindu ‘From the global to the local: The role of international law in the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights in South Africa’ (2009) Socio-Economic Rights Project Research Series 6, 33. 
139
  TAC (n 21 above) para 39. 
140
  Jaftha v Schoeman & Others 2005 1 BCLR 78 (CC) para 24 (Jaftha). 
141
  CCT 28/08 2009 16 ZACC para 237 and see UN Committee on ESCR, General Comment 7, The right to adequate 
housing (art 11.1 of the Covenant) forced evictions, UN Doc E/1998/22 (1998). 
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 With regard to approaches to enforcing SERS, in the TAC case, the amici142 raised the 
argument that article 27(1) has a minimum core143 component. The Constitutional Court, in deciding 
on the use of the minimum core, relied on General Comment No 3 of the Committee on ESCR. The 
Constitutional Court endorsing its position in Grootboom, without explicitly rejecting the minimum 
core component of sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution, held as follows: 144 
Although Yacoob J [in Grootboom] indicated that evidence in a particular case may show that there is 
a minimum core of a particular service that should be taken into account in determining whether 
measures adopted by the state are reasonable, the socio-economic rights in the Constitution should 
not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be provided to them.... 
It is impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ service immediately. All that is possible, and 
all that can be expected of the state, is that it acts reasonably to provide access to socio-economic 
rights in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis... 
 
However, there were reasons advanced by the Constitutional Court as to why they could not apply 
the minimum core content and it was as follows: 145 
Courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide ranging factual and political enquiries 
necessary for determining what the minimum core standards should be ... [and added that] courts are 
ill suited to adjudicate upon issues where the court order could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a more restrained and 
focused role for the courts. 
Recently, in the Mazibuko146 decision handed down on 8 October 2009, the Constitutional Court was 
again unwilling to adopt the minimum core approach. It referred to General Comment No 3 as well 
                                                           
142
  The amici in the case of Grootboom also raised the same point.  
143
  The minimum core obligation has been defined in General Comment No 3 (n 42 above) in para 10. The 
Committee on ESCR observed an ‘obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be 
read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être.’   
144
  TAC (n 21 above) para 34-35. 
145
  TAC (n 21 above) para 37 & 38. 
146
  Mazibuko (n 21 above) paras 52 – 68. This case concerned the right to water, specifically, the the sufficiency of 
water provided by the City of Johannesburg in terms of its free basic water policy, and the lawfulness of the prepaid water 
meters. 
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as its decisions in Grootboom and TAC in which it refused to accept the concept. The Court refused 
to set a minimum core for water on the bases that ‘what the right requires will vary over time and in 
context’ as well as institutional and democratic concerns, stating as follows:147 
 [O]rdinarily it is institutionally inappropriate ordinarily for a court to determine precisely what the 
 achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps government should 
 take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the 
 legislature and executive, the institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions 
 in the light of available budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to social 
 and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic accountability that they should 
 do so for it is their programmes and promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice. 
It can be deduced that the ‘polycentric’ argument has been heavily relied upon by the Constitutional 
Court to reject the minimum core approach. It is to be noted that the reasonableness test has got 
certain benefits in that it is a context sensitive tool which allows the executive the required space, 
without the judiciary trespassing their terrain, to design and formulate appropriate policies.148 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the minimum core approach in favour of the reasonableness approach 
has been criticised as it does not recognise the minimum basic interests of vulnerable people in their 
survival needs. In other words, it does not provide them with the most basic socio-economic goods 
without which any socio-economic right protection becomes meaningless.149 In view of meeting the 
transformative vision of the Constitution, academics have proposed measures as to how to 
strengthen the reasonableness approach, including the following: (1) the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the programme should be shifted to the state,150 and (2) in the event that a state 
fails to ensure that vulnerable groups have access to basic services, the state should be required to 
show that their resources were ‘demonstrably inadequate.’151 
 It seems that the Constitutional Court is able reject the minimum core because South 
Africa has not yet ratified the ICESCR. However, Kapindu has observed that since South Africa has 
                                                           
147
  Mazibuko (n 21 above) paras 60, 61 & 62. 
148
  S Liebenberg ‘Enforcing positive socio-economic rights claims: The South African model of reasonableness 
review’ in J Squires et al Thiele (eds) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural 
rights (2005) 81. 
149
  D Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 11-12. 
150
  S Liebenberg (n 148 above) 83. 
151
  S Liebenberg (n 148 above) 83. 
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ratified the African Charter and in the SERAC152 case the African Commission found that the 
minimum core obligations form part of state party obligations and states are bound to apply them in 
order to be in conformity with the African Charter. Hence, since  South Africa is bound by the African 
Charter it finds itself under the obligation to apply the minimum core concept.153 
 However the Constitutional Court should at least be commended for enforcing the negative 
duties in sections 26(1)154 and 27(1)155 to ‘desist from preventing or impairing access’ to the listed 
SERs. In Jaftha,156 the Constitutional Court held that the negative duties in relation to the right of 
access to adequate housing are not subject to any internal limitations of ‘progressive realisation’ and  
the ‘availability of resources,’157 hence being of immediate application. Consequently, the decision of 
the Court as to whether there is a violation of a SER is dependent upon the interpretation adopted 
by the Court. If the Court adopts the ‘rationality’ and ‘good faith’ tests of Soobramaney, this will 
merely rubberstamp the executive’s action and leave the victim without an effective remedy.;158 
though the Constitution is aimed at ‘establishing freedom and equality in a grossly disparate 
society.’159  
 There is therefore a very close link between the interpretation adopted by the Court and the 
remedies that are granted. Consequently, this link justifies a study of remedies available for the 
infringement of SERs under the Constitution. 
                                                           
152
  Communication 155/96 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & Another v Nigeria (SERAC), Fifteenth 
Annual Activity Report,  para 65 which endorses the minimum core of the right to food. 
<http://www.achpr.org/english/activity_reports/activity15_en.pdf > (accessed 21 October 2009). 
153
  Kapindu (n 138 above) 49. 
154
  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 34. 
155
  TAC (n 21 above) para 46. 
156
  Jaftha (n 140 above) where there was a constitutional challenge of the Magistrate’s Court Act which allowed the 
sale of the debtor’s home so as to reimburse debts. The arguments raised were that this violated the debtor’s right to 
housing as it prevented his access to adequate housing. 
157
  Jaftha (n 140 above) paras 31-34 where the Court added that they are instead subject to the general limitations 
under section 36 of the Constitution. 
158
  M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 410. 
159
  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) para 147. 
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3.5 Remedies for infringement of SERs 
Having dealt with the interpretation part, it is necessary to consider the types of remedies that the 
Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to grant when it finds that a law or conduct is 
unconstitutional. Prior to embarking on the South African context, it has to be pointed out that 
General Comment No 9 of the Committee on ESCR provides that national remedies should be 
‘accessible, affordable, timely and effective’ and that international complaints mechanisms are only 
supplementary to domestic remedies.160 However, in the South African context, though the ICESCR 
has not been ratified, the Constitution does provide for the following remedies. Section 172(1)(a) of 
the Constitution provides that in case of a finding of an unconstitutional law or conduct, the Court 
must declare the provision or conduct unconstitutional to the extent of its inconsistency.  Moreover, 
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for the Court to make any order that is just and 
equitable, along with section 38 which allows the Court to grant an appropriate relief. The issue of 
an appropriate relief has been dealt with in the TAC case where that the Court stated as follows: 
The nature of the right infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the 
appropriate relief in a particular case. Where necessary this may include both the issuing of a mandamus 
and the exercise of a supervisory jurisdiction.
161
 
The Court’s duty is to provide not only an appropriate, but also an effective remedy. In the case of 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (Fose),162 the Constitutional Court held that ‘the Courts have a 
particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to forge new tools and shape innovative 
remedies, if need be, to achieve this goal’. Therefore, the Court can always, under the guise of 
appropriateness and effectiveness, have recourse to tailor-made remedies which will do justice to 
the aggrieved parties.  
 Having gone through the conceptual legal framework available to judges to decide on 
remedies, the remedies granted by the Constitutional Court in its SERs jurisprudence shall then 
considered in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 In the very first SERs case before the Constitutional Court, that is, Soobramaney the 
applicant lost his case; hence no relief was granted to him and he died two days after the judgment 
                                                           
160
  General Comment No 9 (n 65 above) para 7 & 8.  
161
  TAC (n 21 above) para 106. 
162
  Fose 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
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was delivered.163 In the TAC case, the Court made a declaratory order as well as a mandatory order, 
extending the provision of the required drugs and counselling facilities to other sites apart from the 
pilot sites.164 In Khosa v Minister of Social Development (Khosa),165 which was based on the equality 
principle, the Court read in ‘the excluded group of people’ for them to benefit from social security.166 
In the Port Elizabeth167case, the Court read positive obligations into article 26(3) of the Constitution, 
which imposes negative duties.168 In addition, in the case of President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others  (Modderklip),169 the Court awarded,  based 
on the principle of the rule of law, compensation to the landowner for failure of  the government to 
remedy the invasion of his land by squatters.170   
 However, it would seem that compliance with the orders remains a key issue. For example, 
the Grootboom community continues to live in appalling conditions, Irene Grootboom died eight 
years after the judgment while still living in a shack and the implementation of the emergency 
housing programme has been rather slow; and the TAC case, though subsequently implemented, 
was followed by a lack of urgency in its implementation.171 Therefore, the Court should come up 
with novel and creative remedies to ensure that lack of or slow compliance is not a bar to an 
effective remedy. Consequently, academics have proposed the adoption of the remedy of structural 
interdicts which will allow the courts to exercise supervisory jurisdiction on the government to have 
                                                           
163
  MS Kende Constitutional rights in two worlds (2009) 251. 
164
  TAC (n 21 above) para 135. 
165
  2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). This case concerned access to social assistance for permanent residents. 
166
  Khosa (n 165 above) para 43. 
167
  Port Elizabeth case (n 116 above).  
168
  Port Elizabeth (n 116 above), para 28 -29, where the Court held that prior to an eviction order being granted, it 
will have regard to whether reasonable alternative accommodation is available. 
169
  2005 8 BCLR (CC). The case concerned the right to have access to adequate housing of those faced with evictions, 
as well as the property rights of the owner of the land. 
170
  Modderklip (n 169 above) para 43& 48. 
171 
 See L Chenwi ‘Socio-economic gains and losses: The Constitutional Court and social change’ (2009) 12. Paper 
presented at the symposium ‘Fifteen years of democracy in South Africa: Gains and challenges’ held at the University of the 
Western Cape from 21 to 22 May (on file with author); F Hweshe ‘“Herione” dies while still waiting’ 
<http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20080804110512425C272924 (accessed 28 October 
2009). 
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them report back within a specific time period172, thereby providing a solution to the problem of lack 
of compliance by the executive. 
3.6 Conclusion 
It can be said that, by integrating SERs in its Constitution, South Africa has travelled a long way 
compared to other developed countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States, which are 
reputed as champions of human rights. It should also be commended for its jurisprudence which it is 
slowly building on justiciable SERs, having in mind the cautious approach of the Constitutional Court 
in interpreting SERs and in granting remedies. Yet, as seen in the discussions above, the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has still not met the full transformative vision of the 
Constitution as poverty is still rampant in South Africa, and worst of all, the interpretative approach 
of the Court has been mostly evasive in providing content to the rights while the remedies granted 
have not always provided justice to the parties. 
 As observed earlier in this chapter, the SAHRC also has a role to play in the implementation 
of SERs. In its SERs reports, the SAHRC assesses the information it collects from the various organs of 
government and this could be used as indicators to monitor the progress made in the realisation of 
SERs chronologically.173 However, its efficacy can seriously be doubted in the realisation of SERs due 
to its lack of consistency in publishing its annual reports. Consequently, the concrete and effective 
enjoyment of SERs will depend on the eagerness of the Constitutional Court to develop a robust 
jurisprudence that mirrors international standards.  It would seem that the justiciable SERs per se, 
are not sufficient to fully respect, protect and fulfil SERs in South Africa, thereby justifying a study of 
the likely added benefits for South Africa to ratify the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol. 
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  Pieterse (n 158 above) 414. 
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  DG Newman ‘Institutional monitoring of social and economic rights: A South African case study and a new 
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Chapter 4 
The likely benefits of ratifying the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights and its Optional Protocol for South Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
For years now, international treaties have been the means to effectively promote and protect 
human rights. International treaties usually ensure compliance through reporting mechanisms and 
individual complaints mechanisms as well as inquiry procedures in some instances. These have been 
operating through international treaty bodies set up by the international conventions. For 
international bodies to be an integral actor in the promotion of SERs in domestic affairs of a state, 
the latter should ratify the treaty establishing the treaty monitoring body. 
  In the case of this study, the treaty being referred to is the ICESCR under which the 
Committee on ESCR operates. The Committee, as noted earlier, was not established by the ICESCR, 
but rather by a resolution of the ECOSOC, which was the supervisory body set up under the 
ICESCR.174 As noted earlier in this study, South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994, but has not yet 
ratified it. As a matter of fact, South Africa has both regional and international commitments with 
regards to SERs. At the regional level, South Africa has already ratified the African Charter, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter)175and the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African 
Women’s Protocol),176 which provide for both CPRs and SERs.177 At the international level, South 
Africa, as mentioned earlier, has ratified the CEDAW and the CRC both of which provide for CPRs and 
SERs in relation to women and children respectively.178 Since both CPRs and SERs are 
                                                           
174
  See chapter 2 section 2.5 of this dissertation. 
175
  This treaty was adopted on 11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. South Africa ratified the 
African Children’s Charter on 7 January 2000. The African Children’s Charter provides for SERs in relation to children. 
176
  This Protocol was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 2005. South Africa ratified the 
African Women’s Protocol on 17 December 2004. The African Women’s Protocol provides for SERs specifically in relation to 
women. 
177
  South Africa ratified the African Charter on the 9 July 1996.  
178
  See chapter 1 section 1.1 of this dissertation. 
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interdependent,179 there exist no plausible reasons as to why South Africa has not yet ratified the 
ICESCR. Indeed, with this ratification, there would have been several benefits in ensuring the 
effective protection of SERs of vulnerable South Africans. 
4.2 The added benefits of ratifying the ICESCR for South Africa 
4.2.1 State reporting mechanism 
Protection and enforcement of SERs under the ICESCR are ensured by state reporting procedures.180  
The state reporting process is the process by which a state party sends periodic reports on a regular 
pre-determined frequency, on its human rights situation in its domestic jurisdiction along with 
measures it has taken to meet its obligations under the treaty it has ratified.181 This procedure uses 
diplomatic means to engage in a constructive dialogue182 with the state party, based on which the 
Committee on ESCR then delivers concluding observations. The concluding observations contain the 
positive measures taken by the state parties in protecting the rights, the negative aspects noted by 
the treaty monitoring body and provides recommendations thereto.183 The effectiveness of the 
concluding observations can be seen through civil societies which use them to force the government 
to abide by same.184 
 In the event that South Africa ratifies the ICESCR, it will subject itself to the treaty 
monitoring procedures. In other words, it will have to submit periodic reports on the 
implementation of the SERs to the Committee on ESCR. As a result, NGOs will be able to participate 
                                                           
179
  See chapter 2 section 2.2 of this dissertation. 
180
  See chapter 2 section 2.5 of this dissertation.  
181
  Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties under articles 16 and 17 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, 24 March 2009, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2 (2009). Usually, 
states must report initially within two years of accepting the ICESCR and thereafter every five years. See 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/> (accessed 13 September 2009). 
182
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 306. 
183
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 306. 
184
  Steiner & Alston (n 32 above) 306. 
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by submitting shadow reports185 on the real life situations, equipping the Committee with better 
information for them to engage with the representatives of the government in a constructive 
dialogue process. In addition, the dynamism with which NGOs operate in South Africa will contribute 
to better implement SERs, since they will urge the government to abide by the recommendations of 
the Committee, when devising its policies.  
 It might be argued that the process of preparing periodic reports might be an onerous one in 
terms of resource implications. However, reports on SERs implementation are already prepared 
under the African Charter, submitted to the African Commission. Since the African Charter itself has 
been largely inspired by the ICESCR with regard to its SERs provisions, it will not be too onerous of a 
burden for the state to report to the ICESCR. In addition, the guidelines relating to SERs under the 
African Charter are largely inspired by the general comments of the Committee on ESCR, showing 
the intertwined contents of the SERs in both instruments.186 
4.2.2 The effects of ratification on the interpretation of SERs provisions of the 
 Constitution 
The Committee on ESCR, as noted earlier, also issues general comments187 which interpret the 
provisions of the ICESCR. These are authoritative interpretations by the Committee of the rights in 
the ICESCR. The ratification of the ICESCR will have a direct impact on the interpretation of the 
constitutional SERs provisions in South Africa. The Constitution provides that in interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, reference must be made to international law.188 In addition, in the case of Grootboom, it 
was stated that where a relevant ‘principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly 
applicable.’189 Hence, the ratification of the ICESCR will bind South Africa and will enhance the 
interpretation of the SERs provisions in the Constitution. For example, the Constitutional Court has 
                                                           
185
  NGO participation in activities of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Economic and Social 
Council, 12 May 1993, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/WP.14  
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1993.WP.14.En?Opendocument> (accessed 13 September 2009).  
186
  See Draft Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (2009) (On file with author). 
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  The CESCR has until now issued 20 general comments, the latest being in 2009 on article 2(2) of the ICESCR. See 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm> (accessed 13 September 2009). 
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  Section 39(1) (b) of the Constitution. 
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  Grootboom (n 21 above) para 45. 
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adopted the reasonableness approach at the expense of the minimum core190 approach, as designed 
by the Committee on ESCR, which has resulted in severe criticisms of its judgments in this regard in 
the academic circles.191 Therefore, if the South African government ratifies the ICESCR, it would 
enhance the interpretation of SERs with a better chance of incorporating the minimum core 
obligations. In so doing, the Constitutional Court would be fulfilling its international law obligations 
which the executive expressly and consensually acceded to by ratification. Further, the 
Constitutional Court has relied on polycentric, institutional and democratic reasons and the lack of 
sufficient information to support its rejection of the minimum core concept.192 Hence, with the 
ratification of the ICESCR, not only will the authoritative interpretation of the Committee on ESCR 
bind the judiciary, but it will also bind the executive. In other words, the executive which has the 
expertise, the necessary resources and information will have to abide by the general comments in 
designing their policies. As a result, this will enhance the implementation of SERs in South Africa.  
4.2.3 The ‘mobilisation of shame’ principle 
The effectiveness of international law relies on the ‘mobilisation of shame’193  principle. In other 
words, states in order to preserve their international image and reputation act and abide by 
international treaties. The same applies for South Africa when it comes to the ICESCR. South Africa is 
famous for its justiciable SERs provisions;194 however it is reluctant to ratify the ICESCR. As a result, 
the international reputation of South Africa in international forums on SERs is affected in a negative 
way. In addition, the ratification would act as an opportunity for the South African government to 
boost its international reputation by ‘reiterating its commitment to alleviating poverty and ensuring 
social justice.’195 
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4.2.4 The interdependence and interrelatedness of CPRs and SERs 
As discussed previously, SERs are interdependent with CPRs.196 This is clearly shown by the South 
African Constitution itself which provides for both CPRs and SERs.197 This can be perceived through 
an analysis of General Comment 20 198which speaks about equality and links it to SERs.199 Therefore, 
the failure by South Africa to ratify the ICESCR seems to be pointing in the direction that South Africa 
is giving undue priority to CPRs. Ratification of the ICESCR would reaffirm South Africa’s acceptance 
of the interdependence of all human rights.200 In fact, South Africa should have no difficulty in 
ratifying the ICESCR which will simply reiterate its stand that SERs and CPRs are interrelated as seen 
from the African Charter to which the country is already a party. 
4.2.5 The introspection of incompatible legislation 
 The ratification process also involves the introspection of all existing legislations and policies in 
order to align them with provisions of the ICESCR.201  Hence, if South Africa ratifies the ICESCR, it 
would have to carry out a proper introspection of its legislation and policies. As a consequence, laws 
and policies which run counter to the letter and spirit of the ICESCR will have to be repealed. It can 
be argued that this exercise may save substantial financial and human resources which otherwise 
could potentially have been used to challenge these laws in court.  
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2 of this dissertation. 
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  See the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. 
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  UN Committee on ESCR, General Comment 20, Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc 
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  Art 2(2) of the ICESCR.  
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4.2.6 The insufficiency of the South African Bill of Rights 
One persistent objection of South Africa to ratify the ICESCR has been that the Bill of Rights 
sufficiently provides for SERs.202 However, as noted in the previous chapter, the nature and scope of 
some of the SERs provided for in the Bill of Rights are not the same as those in the ICESCR.203 For 
instance, the right to work is not as explicitly provided for in the Bill of Rights and the right to 
education is not extensive as in the ICESCR.204 Therefore, the ratification of the ICESCR will cure the 
lacunas of the South African Bill of Rights by obliging the government to implement its provisions, 
using the ICESCR as a guide.  
4.2.7 The principle of continuity 
The principle of continuity in international law ensures that a state party to an international treaty 
continues to fulfil its obligations under the treaty despite changes in the government of the country. 
Therefore, by ratifying the ICESCR, the government is committing itself for the benefit of the people, 
particularly the poor, and safeguarding them against the potential tyranny of any subsequent 
government in power even if the Constitution is to be amended by a required majority.205  
4.3 The added value for South Africa to ratify the Optional Protocol 
The ratification of the OP-ICESCR has not really been an issue in the South African context,206 
considering that South Africa has not yet ratified the mother treaty and the OP-ICESCR was  recently 
adopted. This also explains the lack of literature on ratification of the OP-ICESCR. This therefore 
warrants a consideration of comparative debates that could have some relevance for South Africa. In 
Norway, for instance, there have been academic debates about whether to ratify the OP-ICESCR or 
not. Hence, to the extent that the reasons in the context of Norway are relevant and applicable in 
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the South African context; they will be used to justify the ratification of the OP-ICESCR. It is also 
important to consider the arguments that have been raised in other contexts, so as to counter them 
from being raised in the South African context. In addition, the assessment of the benefits in 
ratifying the OP-ICESCR and the objections raised in the process by academics will further be tackled.  
 It is worth noting from the onset that the ratification of the OP-ICESCR will not only benefit 
the general protection of human rights, but may also reaffirm a good faith position of government 
policies. In other words, victims seeking redress from the Committee on ESCR through the 
complaints mechanism might find themselves in a situation where they do not have a valid case 
because their respective government is fulfilling its obligations in good faith. As a result, victims are 
not only empowered to make complaints, but are also educated on the limits of their claims.207  
4.3.1 The dynamic interpretation of the Committee on ESCR 
There has been the argument that the ‘evolutive or dynamic’ interpretation of international bodies 
on human rights treaty provisions transfers the ‘legislative powers from the national parliament 
based on general elections’ to the international body of experts.208 Concerning the issue of 
transferring legislative powers to an international body of experts, this argument does not stand as 
the state, through ratification, has wilfully committed itself to fulfilling its obligations and 
recognising the competence of the supervisory body of the treaty. Therefore, in view of the 
consensual act of binding itself, the state has expressly given a victim the right to address its 
complaints to an international body while the state undertakes to fulfil all its obligations in good 
faith. In any case, the Committee on ESCR will not be legislating for the state; it will only provide 
recommendations on which the state will have to act to remedy the situation of the victims. It would 
be a fallacy for this objection to mean that, similar to laws from parliament, the recommendation of 
the Committee will have force of law and will be enforceable in courts. 
 Another point that has been advanced is that there is no need for incorporating the OP-
ICESCR as national courts already have the means of enforcing justiciable SERs while simultaneously 
taking into consideration ‘national legislature and the national situation’ especially in view of the 
dynamic interpretation of international bodies.209 This objection was raised in the case of Norway. It 
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is relevant to consider this objection in the South African context as the latter already has a court 
which applies and interprets its constitutionally guaranteed SERs. As has already been seen in the 
previous chapter, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has not been that effective in its remedies 
and interpretation, hence warranting the ratification of the OP-ICESCR which may correct such 
defects through the Committee’s views and recommendations. That is, if a victim does not obtain a 
remedy from the national court, the latter can always have recourse to the Committee on ESCR. 
4.3.2 The alleged helplessness of a state party in front of the Committee on ESCR 
When a case is brought to the Committee on ESCR, the state will have the opportunity to influence 
the Committee through its arguments or submissions. However, it has been argued in Norway that it 
is doubtful that the Committee would be influenced, as it will base its findings on previous case 
law.210 This objection is also applicable in the South African context as it relates to the Committee on 
ESCR.  
 A state party may not be able to influence the Committee on ESCR if it is in blatant breach of 
its obligations under the ICESCR. However, if the state party has been consistent in fulfilling its 
obligations and in view of the peculiarities of each case, the state party can definitely influence the 
Committee in its favour, as is the case at the domestic level where the state convinces the court that 
it is in fact meeting its obligations. It would be wrong for states parties to view the Committee on 
ESCR as a body that wants to authoritatively impose human rights obligations on them, as they 
themselves have, through ratification, expressed their willingness to abide by these obligations.  
4.3.3 Enhancing compliance with ICESCR provisions 
In the event that South Africa ratifies the ICESCR, the ratification of the OP-ICESCR should follow suit 
since the latter would help, through the Committee on ESCR’s jurisprudence, in elucidating its 
obligations under the ICESCR, which will arguably improve both implementation and compliance.211 
In addition, there is always the possibility that the individual complaints at the international level 
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may help ‘to improve rights outcome on average’,212 thereby justifying its ratification. Further, South 
Africa should ratify the OP-ICESCR since, if cases are brought before the Committee on ESCR, this will 
deepen knowledge on economic, social and cultural rights.213 Moreover, it will give an opportunity, 
though limited, for vulnerable South African victims of SERs violations to make the executive 
accountable.214 
4.3.4 Complementing the state reporting procedure 
The ratification of the OP-ICESCR becomes more important having regard to the insufficiencies 
associated with the state reporting procedures. Often, periodic reports are overdue or the state 
sugar coats the facts and figures in the reports.215 Though there may be submissions of shadow 
reports by NGOs, there is always the risk that these ‘assessments become ritualised and 
formulaic.’216 Hence, the individual complaints mechanism will complement the ICESCR by providing 
a better understanding of its provisions, which will help states to prepare reports in line with those 
obligations.217 Also, the complaints mechanism under the OP-ICESCR will empower both civil society 
and individuals to have a last resort forum to address any state deficiency in its provision of SERs, 
thereby helping in the interpretation of the same, through ‘the lives and experiences of living 
individuals’.218 That is, the Committee on ESCR would be exposed to concrete cases and not general 
statistics as in state reporting or even shadow reporting. 
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4.3.5 Overjudicialisation of human rights 
Critics against the ratification of the OP-ICESCR have also argued that this is an example of ‘over 
judicialisation of human rights’,219 and will divert resources from the true problems that states 
face.220 Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the OP-ICESCR only complements and does not 
replace any government plans, and to push the argument further, it cannot compensate for any 
‘severe resource constraints, corrupt and inefficient governments or ill-conceived developmental 
plans.’221 This argument of overjudicialisation may be relevant to the South African context 
especially in view of the fact that it already has justiciable SERs. However, the Constitutional Court is 
bound by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and it has already been seen that in areas such as 
education and the right to work, the Bill of Rights is lacking. Hence, through the ratification of the 
OP-ICESCR, this will provide a better protection of SERs under the wider provisions of the ICESCR. 
4.3.6 Assuming a leadership role in human rights at the regional level 
In the context of Norway, the argument was made that though the country may feel that ratification 
will not bring any substantial change in the quality of lives of its citizens, it should nevertheless 
proceed with the ratification, as this will encourage other states to do so,222 and may finally assume 
a leadership position in the region in terms of human rights protection, thereby boosting its regional 
and international political influence and reputation223. This is a useful point for South Africa that has 
always reiterated its commitment to being a world leader in human rights.224 Based on the above 
argument, it is submitted that, if South Africa ratifies the OP-ICESR, it might make the country 
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assume a leadership position in the African region in its human rights protection regime, thus 
impacting positively in its regional political influence. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The benefits laid down in this chapter are aimed at promoting a better human rights protection 
regime in South Africa. It seems that the state is hiding behind its own Bill of Rights as its main 
justification for non-ratification of the ICESCR and its failure to sign and ratify the OP-ICESCR. 
However, if the domestic regime is so effective, how would one explain the level of poverty which is 
plaguing the country?225 Clearly, the domestic provisions are not sufficient and there is a need for 
international pressure to improve the situation. For instance, the Constitutional Court is limited in its 
interventions as it can direct the executive only in matters which reach its doorsteps and is restricted 
by separation of powers concerns. However, the ICESCR with its general comments and views on 
complaints, would exert more pressure on the government in all spheres of its actions exposing the 
latter’s policies to be measured against international standards. Full protection of SERs can only be 
achieved if South Africa ratifies both the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR. After having analysed the 
obligations of the ICESCR, the enforcement of SERs in South Africa and the likely benefits of the 
ratification the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol, the subsequent chapter draws a general conclusion 
as well as offers recommendations and the role of key players in promoting SERs in South Africa. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study has provided a preview of the ICESCR226 and its provisions and the approach of the South 
African Courts in enforcing the justiciable SERs in the South African Constitution.227 The study has 
also highlighted the likely benefits that South Africa might reap from ratifying the ICESCR and its 
Optional Protocol, having regard to the provisions of the ICESCR and the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court.228 As seen earlier, despite the South African Bill of Rights provision for SERs, it is 
still lacking in some major areas like the right to education and the right to work. Nevertheless, the 
South African Bill of Rights should at least be commended for making SERS justiciable while western 
countries are still debating about the latter’s justiciability. With the breakthrough of the OP-ICESCR, 
a major step has been made at the international level in favour of justiciability of SERs. In view of the 
fact that South African courts already adjudicate on SERs, it is recommended for South Africa to 
ratify both the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR, as this will enhance the protection of SERs in its domestic 
application. 
It is true that the ratification of the ICESCR will not result in an ‘overnight’ change in the 
provision of SERs. However, international law has an important role to play in the South African 
jurisdiction be it for the purpose of interpreting laws or legislating or for advancing the enforcement 
of rights in general. Cases such as Grootboom and Joe Slovo show how international law in the form 
of general comments from the Committee on ESCR have impacted on the interpretation of SERs 
provisions. 
 However, in Grootboom, TAC and Mazibuko cases, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
minimum core approach, which has left some poor litigants without direct relief. The reasonableness 
approach that the Court has adopted, though more substantive than the ‘rationality’ test in 
Soobramoney, poses some difficulties for poor litigants without legal representation as they will not 
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be able to put together all the resources required to prove their case. Hence, by ratifying the ICESCR, 
South Africa will be bound to also give effect to the minimum core concept, in addition to its 
obligation to do so under the African Charter. Academics have nevertheless expressed concerns as 
to the impact of the African regional system of human rights in the South African jurisdiction. They 
have argued that the impact of the latter compared to the UN system has been ‘quite minimal’.229 
Considering the impact that the UN system has in the domestic jurisdiction, it is of paramount 
importance for South Africa to ratify the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR for there to be a real hope 
coupled with international pressure to improve the interpretation and the enforcement of SERs in 
the country. In light of the setbacks identified in this dissertation and the recommendations below, 
the ratification of the ICESCR and the OP-ICESCR will definitely provide a boost in the domestic 
protection of SERs in South Africa. 
5.2 Recommendations 
This section provides a number of suggestions that can be taken into account in order to ensure the 
ratification and effective implementation of the ICESCR as well as the effective enforcement of the 
SERs guaranteed in the South African Constitution. The recommendations are directed at state 
actors such as the judiciary, executive and legislature, non-state actors such as NGOs and the media, 
the SAHRC and the African Commission. 
5.2.1 State actors 
The contribution of state actors in the South African constitutional democracy within the context of 
this study would be to provide a more effective domestic implementation of SERs. The ICESCR calls 
upon all member states to promote and give effect to it.230  
 The ratification of the ICESCR should not be an end in itself; hence courts have a role to play 
in ensuring that the provisions of the ICESCR are domesticated and used in interpreting 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.  As seen from the cases discussed in the study where 
international law has been referred to, the Constitutional Court has picked and chosen which 
principles of the ICESCR to give effect to, especially as South Africa has not ratified the treaty. For 
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instance, as stated above, the Constitutional Court rejected the minimum core approach in favour of 
the reasonableness one, thus, focusing more on the procedural part rather than providing content to 
the SERs. It is further submitted that even if South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, the 
Constitutional Court could have been a major player in domesticating the contents of its provisions 
through its judgments and make it the law of the land through common law. 
 Further, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court in the case of Grootboom,231 for 
instance, decided in favour of the applicants, there are still two reasons why the jurisprudence is not 
in its effect pro poor. Firstly, due to the rejection of the minimum core concept, the judgment did 
not provide ‘direct, substantive relief’ to the applicants, thereby providing little prospects to the 
poor to knock at the doors of courts in case they seek relief.232 Secondly, the reasonableness review 
adopted by the court requires applicants to have the complex understanding of policies and 
budgetary issues, hence acting as a disincentive for the poor to bring cases to courts.233  
 Therefore, it is recommended that the ICESCR be ratified so that the Constitutional Court will 
have no excuse to depart from the minimum core obligations which would lessen the onus of proof 
on the victims.  Moreover, the Constitutional Court is recommended to embark on remedies such as 
structural interdicts which will give a supervisory role to the Court and ensure that the remedies it 
prescribes are duly executed by the executive branch. 
 Also, the appropriate ministry which will undertake to implement the ICESCR upon 
ratification has got a very important role. Since all human rights are interrelated and are matters of 
primary concern in any democratic society, the respective ministry should ensure that all 
government departments collaborate in meeting the obligations under the ICESCR, especially 
reporting obligations. It should also act as a peer pressure mechanism for other departments to act 
promptly.  Moreover, it is common knowledge that many poor South Africans are not aware of their 
rights as well as the various mechanisms available for enforcing them. The role of government 
authorities and officials in this regard is important in ensuring that there are appropriate human 
rights education programmes. 
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Further, the legislature is the only body which can, through incorporation in national laws, 
effectively implement the ICESCR. Parliament, within its mandate, has the duty to make the 
government conform to the Constitution. Therefore, it is the primary function of parliament to use 
the parliamentary processes to allow the domestication of the provisions of the ICESCR. Hence, 
parliament can be instrumental in encouraging the government to ratify the ICESCR. In other words, 
members of parliament including the opposition can pressurise the executive, through 
parliamentary debates, to ratify the ICESCR.  
5.2.2 Non-state actors 
With respect to the role of non-state actors such as NGOs, training and education are of prime 
importance. Education and training workshops should be organised more frequently so as to 
sensitise people about their SERs and the means available for them to seek redress in case of 
violation or threats of violation; and also how NGOs can assist them in this regard. In addition, the 
target groups of those workshops should not exclude the municipal officers, journalists and 
academics, for them to properly and efficiently address different SERs issues. NGOs can also support 
and improve state protection of SERs through getting involved in, for instance, the appointments of 
officials who will be occupying posts in constitutional bodies. 
 The media is a powerful instrument as well, which can frame public opinion if proper use is 
made of it. The media can also be used in disseminating information on SERs in a most 
comprehensive way to the different categories of people in society, and in reporting violations made 
and the means sought to redress same, thereby nurturing the support of the public in respecting and 
making others respect human rights standards.  
5.2.3 The role of the SAHRC 
Monitoring the realisation of SERs is important and constitutional institutions such as the SAHRC 
have a role to play in this regard. As mentioned previously in this study, the SAHRC is mandated by 
the Constitution to monitor the implementation of these rights. However, the government needs to 
ensure that the SAHRC is well resourced to be able to effectively carry out this task. Government 
departments must also be responsive to the SAHRC’s call for information, on the extent of 
implementation of rights so as to facilitate assessment of the progress being made and identification 
of challenges. Ratification of the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol will be important in ensuring that 
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the SAHRC’s role is complemented by the Committee on ESCR through the state reporting and 
complaints procedure. 
5.2.4 The role of the African Commission 
Lastly, the African Commission can also play a role in promoting the ratification process of the 
ICESCR by South Africa. Since South Africa is a party to the African Charter and submits periodic 
reports to the African Commission and also makes statements during the sessions of the 
Commission, the latter can exert pressure on South Africa for it to ratify the ICESCR.  
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